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Abstract
We propose a model of two-tier competition between vertically integrated firms and
unintegrated downstream firms. We show that, even when integrated firms compete in
prices to offer a homogeneous input, the Bertrand result may not obtain, and the input
may be priced above marginal cost in equilibrium, which is detrimental to consumers’
surplus and social welfare. We obtain that these partial foreclosure equilibria are more
likely to exist when downstream competition is fierce. We then use our model to assess
the impact of several regulatory tools in the telecommunications industry.
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1 Introduction
In several industries, production has a two-tier structure: firms need to obtain an intermediate
input in order to serve final consumers. In this paper, we focus on industries in which the
intermediate input is produced by vertically integrated firms only. Examples of such a market
structure abound. In the broadband market, Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) operators and
cable networks own a broadband infrastructure and compete at the retail level. They can
also compete to provide wholesale broadband services to unintegrated downstream firms,
which have not built their own network. Similarly, in the mobile telephony market, Mobile
Virtual Network Operators (MVNOs) do not have a spectrum license nor a mobile network
and therefore have to purchase a wholesale mobile service from Mobile Network Operators
(MNOs).
Other examples can be found in licensing contexts. For instance, at the end of the 1990s,
Dow Chemicals and Exxon had developed rival metallocene technologies, which enabled them
to produce polyethylenes. They also licensed their technologies to downstream polyethylenes
producers.2 In the video game industry, some firms (e.g., Epic Games, Valve Corporation)
have designed their own 3D engines to develop 3D video games. They also license these
engines to rival downstream firms (e.g., Electronic Arts).
This raises the following question: does competition between vertically integrated firms on
the upstream market level the playing field between the downstream rivals? More specifically,
we notice that in all the examples mentioned above, downstream entrants have managed to
get access to the intermediate input.3 Yet, should we expect competition on the upstream
market to drive the input price down to marginal cost?
To answer this question, we propose a model in which two vertically integrated firms and
an unintegrated downstream firm compete in prices with differentiated products on a down-
stream market. The goods sold to end-users are derived from an intermediate input that
the integrated firms can produce in-house. Integrated firms compete, first on the upstream
market to provide the input to the unintegrated downstream firm, and second on the down-
stream market with the unintegrated downstream firm. The upstream market exhibits the
usual ingredients of tough competition: integrated firms compete in (linear) prices, produce
a perfectly homogeneous upstream good and incur the same constant marginal cost. Yet,
we show that upstream competition may not drive the input price down to marginal cost,
2See Arora, Fosfuri, and Gambardella (2001), and Arora (1997) for other examples in the chemical industry.
3In the broadband market, there were 453 agreements between incumbent operators and new entrants and
634 agreements for resale in the EU25 member states, as of January 1st, 2008 (see European Commission
2008). In the mobile market, there were 290 MVNOs in 2006 in the UE15 countries (see European Com-
mission, 2007) and at least 60 MVNOs were operating in the first quarter of 2010 in the US (see Federal
Communications Commission, 2010).
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thereby giving rise to partial foreclosure equilibria. In particular, there can exist monopoly-
like equilibria, in which one vertically integrated firm supplies the intermediate input at its
monopoly upstream price, while its integrated rival decides optimally to make no upstream
offer.
The intuition is the following. Assume that integrated firm i supplies the wholesale
market at a strictly positive price-cost margin, and consider the incentives of its integrated
rival j to corner that market. Notice first that, when firm i increases its downstream price,
it recognizes that some of the final consumers it loses will eventually purchase from the
unintegrated downstream firm, thereby increasing upstream demand and revenues. This
implies that firm i charges a higher downstream price than its integrated rival j at the
downstream equilibrium. This effect obviously benefits firm j, which faces a less aggressive
competitor on the final market: this is the softening effect. Now, if firm j undercuts firm i
on the upstream market and becomes the upstream supplier, the roles are reversed: firm i
decreases its downstream price, while firm j increases it. To sum up, firm j faces the following
trade-off when deciding whether to undercut. On the one hand, undercutting yields wholesale
profits; on the other hand, it makes integrated firm i more aggressive on the downstream
market. When the latter effect is strong enough, the incentives to undercut vanish and the
Bertrand logic collapses.4
This implies that, when the softening effect is strong enough, the monopoly outcome on
the upstream market may persist even under the threat of competition on that market. Other
equilibria may exist, but monopoly-like equilibria are Pareto-dominant from the integrated
firms’ viewpoint. Besides, as expected, partial foreclosure equilibria tend to degrade both
social welfare and consumer surplus.
The degree of differentiation at the downstream level has an important impact on the
strength of the softening effect, hence on the competitiveness of the upstream market. In-
tuitively, when final products are strongly differentiated, downstream demands are almost
independent and the softening effect is consequently weak. As a result, undercutting on the
upstream market is always profitable, and competition drives the wholesale price down to
marginal cost. Conversely, when downstream products are strong substitutes, the softening
effect is strong and the monopoly outcome is an equilibrium.
Another key determinant for the emergence of partial foreclosure equilibria is the ef-
ficiency of the unintegrated downstream firm. An inefficient downstream competitor sets
higher downstream prices, supplies fewer downstream consumers, and therefore, demands
4That an integrated firm changes its downstream behavior when it supplies a non-integrated rival has
already been noted in the literature. See Chen (2001), Fauli-Oller and Sandonis (2002), Sappington (2005)
and Chen and Riordan (2007) among others. The novelty of our paper is to analyze the implications of these
upstream-downstream interactions on upstream competition between vertically integrated firms.
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less intermediate input. This tends to reduce the upstream profits, which weakens the incen-
tives to undercut and makes partial foreclosure a more likely outcome.
We obtain an even stronger result under two-part tariff competition. We show that partial
foreclosure equilibria with strictly positive upstream profits always exist when firms compete
in two-part tariffs on the upstream market.
Our framework is especially relevant to analyze competition on wholesale markets in the
telecommunications industry. As we have just seen, wholesale competition in telecoms may
fail to develop, and therefore, there may be a scope for regulatory intervention in these mar-
kets. We show that several regulatory tools, which have been considered or implemented by
telecoms regulators, can destroy all partial foreclosure equilibria. First, we derive conditions
on the demand and cost functions, under which a wholesale price cap can restore the com-
petitiveness of the upstream market. Second, the vertical separation of an integrated firm, or
the entry of an unintegrated upstream competitor, can destroy partial foreclosure equilibria.
Our paper is related to several strands of the literature. The literature on one-way access
pricing deals with situations in which a service-based firm must gain access to the network
of a historical incumbent (Laffont and Tirole 2001, Armstrong 2002, de Bijl and Peitz 2002).
These works are, by definition, silent on the issue of wholesale competition.
The question addressed in this paper closely echoes the old antitrust debate on the anti-
competitive effects of vertical integration. According to the traditional foreclosure doctrine,
vertical integration can be anticompetitive, since vertically integrated firms have incentives
to raise their rivals’ costs. This theory was criticized by Chicago School authors (see Bork
1978 and Posner 1976), on the ground that firms cannot leverage market power from one
market to another one. More recently, the literature on vertical mergers has revisited these
issues by analyzing extensively wholesale competition between a vertically integrated firm
and an unintegrated upstream firm. Ordover, Saloner and Salop (1990) argue that such a
market structure is unlikely to yield tough competition on the wholesale market when the
vertically integrated firm can commit ex ante to its upstream price. Choi and Yi (2000)
provide foundations for this commitment power through the choice of input specification.
With upstream cost asymmetries and upstream switching costs, Chen (2001) shows that the
integrated firm partially forecloses its unintegrated downstream rival in equilibrium. Chen
and Riordan (2007) argue that an exclusive dealing contract enables the integrated firm to
implement partial foreclosure in equilibrium.5 Surprisingly, this strand of literature has not
dealt with wholesale competition between vertically integrated structures, which, as we ar-
gued previously, is crucial in several industries. Our main result is that upstream competition
between integrated firms may lead to equilibrium foreclosure even in the absence of upstream
5See also Sandonis and Fauli-Oller (2006) for an analysis of vertical integration in a licensing context.
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commitment power, input choice specification, upstream cost asymmetries or switching costs,
and exclusive dealing contracts.6,7
Two recent exceptions are Ordover and Shaffer (2007) and Brito and Pereira (2006), who
present models with several vertically integrated firms and a downstream entrant. They are
mainly interested in whether a wholesale market will emerge at all, i.e., whether the entrant
can be completely foreclosed in equilibrium. In both papers, when non-integrated competi-
tors are able to obtain the input, competition between integrated firms on the upstream
market leads them to price the input at its marginal cost. By contrast, we work out a more
general model and show that partial foreclosure can actually arise at equilibrium. Our pre-
dictions are therefore drastically different from theirs: the fact that entry does occur, as is
the case in the industries mentioned earlier, is not sufficient to ensure that competition on
the input market levels the playing field between the downstream rivals. Ho¨ﬄer and Schmidt
(2008) take a complementary perspective and study the impact on consumers’ surplus of the
entry of unintegrated downstream firms. They show that service-based competition can be
detrimental to consumers, due to the softening effect.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 presents our
main results. Section 4 analyzes the efficacy of several regulatory tools. Section 5 discusses
several extensions and robustness checks of our basic framework. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
Firms. There are two vertically integrated firms, denoted by 1 and 2, and one unintegrated
downstream firm, denoted by d. Integrated firms are composed of an upstream and a down-
stream unit, which produce the intermediate input and the final good, respectively. The
unintegrated downstream competitor is composed of a downstream unit only. In order to be
active on the final market, it must purchase the intermediate input from one of the integrated
firms on the upstream market.
Both integrated firms produce the upstream good under constant returns to scale at unit
cost cu. The downstream product is derived from the intermediate input on a one-to-one
basis with the twice continuously differentiable cost function ck(.), for firm k ∈ {1, 2, d}. We
assume that integrated firms have the same downstream cost function: c1(.) = c2(.).
6Salinger (1988) and Nocke and White (2007) consider situations in which several integrated firms compete
on the wholesale market. These papers, however, do not study tough price competition. The former assumes
Cournot competition on both markets, while the latter focuses on tacit collusion on the input market.
7Hart and Tirole (1990) have initiated another strand of the vertical foreclosure literature, which analyzes
the consequences of secret upstream offers, and focuses mainly on the commitment problem faced by an
upstream monopolist.
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Markets. All firms compete in prices on the downstream market and provide imperfect
substitutes to final customers. Let pk be the downstream price set by firm k ∈ {1, 2, d}
and p ≡ (p1, p2, pd) the vector of final prices. Firm k’s demand, denoted by Dk(p), is twice
continuously differentiable; it depends negatively on firm k’s price and positively on its
competitors’ prices: ∂Dk/∂pk ≤ 0 with a strict inequality whenever Dk > 0, and ∂Dk/∂pk′ ≥
0 with a strict inequality whenever Dk > 0 and Dk′ > 0, for k 6= k′ ∈ {1, 2, d}. We
also suppose that the total demand is non-increasing in each price: for all k′ ∈ {1, 2, d},∑
k∈{1,2,d} ∂Dk/∂pk′ ≤ 0. Symmetry of the integrated firms is assumed again: D1(p1, p2, pd) =
D2(p2, p1, pd) and Dd(p1, p2, pd) = Dd(p2, p1, pd) for all p.
On the upstream market, integrated firms compete in prices and offer perfectly homoge-
neous products. We denote by ai the upstream price set by integrated firm i ∈ {1, 2}.8 The
structure of the model is summarized in Figure 1.
Final Consumers
Downstream
good
(cost c1(.))
Downstream
good
(cost cd(.))
Downstream
good
(cost c2(.))
Upstream
good
(cost cu)
Upstream
good
(cost cu)
Firm 1 Firm 2
Firm d
p1 pd p2
a1 a2
Downstream
Market
Upstream
Market
Figure 1: Structure of the model.
Timing. The sequence of decision-making is as follows:
Stage 1 – Upstream competition: Vertically integrated firms announce their prices on the up-
stream market. Then, the unintegrated downstream firm elects at most one upstream
provider.
8Throughout the paper, subscripts i and j refer to integrated firms only, whereas subscript k refers either
to an integrated firm or to the unintegrated downstream firm.
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Stage 2 – Downstream competition: All firms set their prices on the downstream market.
We focus on pure strategy subgame-perfect equilibria and reason by backward induction.
Profits. Assume that the unintegrated downstream firm is active on the downstream mar-
ket. The profit of integrated firm i ∈ {1, 2} which supplies the upstream market at price ai
is:9
p˜i
(i)
i (p, ai) = (pi − cu)Di(p)− ci(Di(p)) + (ai − cu)Dd(p).
The profit of integrated firm j 6= i ∈ {1, 2} which does not supply the upstream market is
given by:
p˜i
(i)
j (p, ai) = (pj − cu)Dj(p)− cj(Dj(p)).
The profit of unintegrated downstream firm d is:
p˜i
(i)
d (p, ai) = (pd − ai)Dd(p)− cd(Dd(p)).
Note that when the upstream price is equal to the upstream unit cost, i.e., ai = cu, there is no
upstream profit and all firms compete on a level playing field. This is the perfect competition
outcome on the upstream market.
3 Main Results
3.1 Preliminaries
Downstream market competition. Consider that at least one integrated firm has made
an acceptable upstream offer, i.e., an offer that allows firm d to be active and earn strictly
positive profits on the downstream market. Denote by i ∈ {1, 2} the upstream supplier.
For k ∈ {1, 2}, define BR(i)k (p−k, ai) = arg maxpk p˜i(i)k (p, ai) the best-response function of
integrated firm k.10 We assume that BR
(i)
k (p−k, ai) is unique, bounded and well-defined
by the corresponding first-order condition for any p−k ∈ [0,∞)2 and any acceptable ai. In
order to obtain well-behaved comparative statics, we make the following stability assumption:∣∣∣∣∂BR(i)j∂pj′ (pj′ , pd, cu)
∣∣∣∣ < 1, for all j′ 6= j in {1, 2}, for all pj′ , pd ≥ 0.11
9Throughout the paper, the superscript in parenthesis indicates the identity of the upstream supplier.
10As usual, p−k is the vector obtained by removing pk from vector p.
11This corresponds to the stability condition in a hypothetical game, in which unintegrated downstream
firm d would be supplied at price cu and would set downstream price pd, and both vertically integrated firms
would set their downstream prices simultaneously. See Vives (2001, p. 51).
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We assume that there exists a unique Nash equilibrium on the downstream market, and
we denote by p
(i)
k (ai) the equilibrium price of firm k ∈ {1, 2, d}, and by p(i)(ai) the vector
of these downstream prices. At the equilibrium of this subgame, firms’ profits are given
by functions pi
(i)
k (ai) ≡ p˜i(i)k (p(i)(ai), ai), which are defined over the set of acceptable offers.
Note that, when the upstream product is priced at marginal cost, p
(i)
i (cu) = p
(i)
j (cu) and
pi
(i)
i (cu) = pi
(i)
j (cu). We assume that pi
(i)
i (cu) and pi
(i)
d (cu) are strictly positive.
Choice of upstream supplier. If only one integrated firm has made an acceptable offer,
then it is obviously chosen by the unintegrated downstream firm.
Consider now that both offers are acceptable. If pi
(i)
d (ai) > pi
(j)
d (aj), then firm d chooses
firm i as its upstream supplier. If both offers lead to the same profit, then firm d chooses
any of them.12 We now make the following economically meaningful assumption:
Assumption 1. pi
(i)
d (.) is strictly decreasing.
13
If firm d preferred to choose the most expensive upstream provider, we would have another,
somewhat trivial (and pathological), reason for the existence of partial foreclosure equilibria.
Assumption 1 rules out these cases.
Upstream monopoly benchmark. Consider the hypothetical scenario in which the up-
stream market is monopolized by integrated firm i. We assume for the moment that, in this
case, firm i makes an acceptable offer to firm d:
Assumption 2. When integrated firm j has made no acceptable upstream offer, integrated
firm i cannot, or does not want to, completely foreclose firm d.
It follows immediately that complete foreclosure of the unintegrated downstream firm will
never arise in equilibrium. In Section 5.2, we relax Assumption 2 and we show that it can
hold because firm i actually wants to supply firm d in order to attract new consumers, or
because of regulatory constraints, or because firm d can invest to start producing the input
in-house.
We also assume:
Assumption 3. pi
(i)
i (.) is strictly quasi-concave, and it has a unique maximum at am > cu.
12Other tie-breaking rules would not change our results. For instance, in Section 5.1, we consider the
possibility that firm d splits its upstream demand between integrated firms.
13In line with most IO models, Assumption 1 posits that the direct effect of a cost increase on profit
outweighs the strategic ones.
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To summarize, if the upstream market were exogenously monopolized, the unintegrated
downstream firm would not be completely foreclosed, and monopoly market power on the
upstream market would lead to a strictly positive markup on the price of the intermediate
input, i.e., to partial foreclosure. In the sequel, am is referred to as the monopoly upstream
price.
At this stage, we can already notice that, under Assumptions 1 and 3, integrated firms
offering a1 = a2 = cu is an equilibrium outcome.
Remark 1. Under Assumptions 1 and 3, the perfect competition outcome on the upstream
market is an equilibrium.
Proof. Consider that integrated firms offer a1 = a2 = cu. Then, if firm d elects firm i as
its upstream supplier, pi
(i)
i (cu) = pi
(i)
j (cu). If an integrated firm deviates upwards, then, by
Assumption 1, firm d still purchases the input at marginal cost from the other integrated
firm, and the integrated firms’ profits are not affected. If on the other hand, an integrated
firm, say i, deviates downwards by setting ai < cu, its profit becomes pi
(i)
i (ai). This is less
than pi
(i)
i (cu), since pi
(i)
i is strictly quasi-concave and am > cu.
3.2 Persistence of the monopoly outcome
We now study the first stage of our game in which integrated firms compete on the upstream
market, and establish the main result of the paper. We show that the usual mechanism of
Bertrand competition may be flawed and that partial foreclosure equilibria may exist.
Assume that integrated firm i has made an acceptable upstream offer to firm d, ai > cu,
and let us see whether integrated firm j 6= i is willing to slightly undercut to corner the
upstream market, as would be the case with standard (single-market) Bertrand competition.
The analysis proceeds in two steps. First, we look at prices at the downstream equilibrium.
Second, we compare the profits of firms i and j.
The integrated firms’ best-responses on the downstream market are characterized by the
following first-order conditions:
∂p˜i
(i)
i
∂pi
(p, ai) = Di + (pi − c′i(Di)− cu)
∂Di
∂pi
+ (ai − cu)∂Dd
∂pi
= 0,(1)
∂p˜i
(i)
j
∂pj
(p, ai) = Dj + (pj − c′j(Dj)− cu)
∂Dj
∂pj
= 0.(2)
The comparison between (1) and (2) indicates that the upstream supplier has more incen-
tives to raise its downstream price than its integrated rival. Realizing that final customers
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lost on the downstream market may be recovered via the upstream market, the upstream
supplier is less aggressive than its integrated rival on the downstream market. As formally
shown in Appendix, this mechanism, together with our stability assumption, implies that the
upstream supplier charges a higher downstream price than its integrated rival at the subgame
equilibrium.
Lemma 1. Let ai > cu be an acceptable offer. Then the upstream supplier charges a strictly
higher downstream price than its integrated rival:
p
(i)
i (ai) > p
(i)
j (ai).
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
This soft behavior favors the other integrated firm which, by a revealed preference ar-
gument, earns more downstream profit than the upstream supplier. We shall refer to that
mechanism as the ‘softening effect’.
Lemma 2. Let ai > cu be an acceptable offer. Then, the upstream supplier earns strictly
smaller downstream profits than its integrated rival:[
p
(i)
i (ai)− cu
]
Di(p
(i)(ai))− ci
(
Di(p
(i)(ai))
)
<
[
p
(i)
j (ai)− cu
]
Dj(p
(i)(ai))− cj
(
Dj(p
(i)(ai))
)
.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
A key consequence of that result is that we cannot tell unambiguously which of the
integrated firms earns more total profits. On the one hand, the upstream supplier extracts
revenues from the upstream market. On the other hand, its integrated rival benefits from
larger downstream profits, owing to the softening effect.
We can now come back to our initial question. When an integrated firm undercuts the
upstream market, it obtains the upstream profits at the cost of making its integrated rival
more aggressive on the downstream market. Therefore an integrated firm may not always
want to undercut its integrated rival on the upstream market. Notice that we do not need any
assumptions on the strategic interactions between downstream prices to obtain this tradeoff
between capturing the upstream profits and benefiting from the softening effect. When the
latter effect outweighs the former, the usual logic of Bertrand competition may not work
anymore, and in particular, the monopoly outcome can be an equilibrium.
Proposition 1. Under Assumptions 1-3, there exists an equilibrium in which the upstream
market is supplied by an integrated firm at price am if and only if
(3) pi
(i)
j (am) ≥ pi(i)i (am).
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These equilibria are referred to as monopoly-like equilibria.
Proof. Assume that condition (3) holds. Suppose firm i offers ai = am and firm j makes an
unacceptable offer. Then, firm j has no incentives to undercut firm i and, by Assumptions 2
and 3, firm i has no incentives to deviate. Conversely, assume that condition (3) does not
hold. If firm i supplies the upstream market at price am, then it is strictly profitable for firm
j to propose am − ε with ε > 0 sufficiently small, an offer which firm d would accept, by
Assumption 1.14
Proposition 1 might sound somewhat tautological. Yet, our contribution is to show that,
contrary to the conventional wisdom and what the existing literature states, condition (3)
may well be satisfied. Because losers on the upstream market become winners on the down-
stream market, the usual competitive forces may collapse. This effect does not hinge on any
commitment device for the integrated firms to exit the upstream market;15 nor does this rely
on any kind of overt or tacit collusion. To complete the analysis, it remains to show that
condition (3) is indeed satisfied with several standard demand specifications. We provide
such examples in Sections 3.4 and 5.1.
As compared to the existing literature, we do not specify the downstream demand func-
tions. This allows us to stay at a higher level of generality. Ordover and Shaffer (2007)
consider a linear specification and a particular range of parameters over which condition (3)
is not satisfied (see footnote 21). In Brito and Pereira (2006), there is a third integrated firm,
and downstream competition takes place on the Salop circle. Two of the integrated firms
are not in interaction with each other on the downstream market, and the third integrated
firm does not interact with the entrant, which considerably weakens the softening effect. As
a consequence, condition (3) does not hold in their framework.16 By carefully picking apart
the effects which govern firms’ undercutting decisions, we show that these results have lim-
itations, and that one cannot predict the outcome of the upstream price competition game
without assessing the strength of the softening effect.
3.3 Other equilibria
In this section, we give a complete characterization of the subgame-perfect equilibria of our
game.
14Notice that different strategies can be used to support a monopoly-like equilibrium: ai = am and aj
unacceptable, or ai = am and aj > am acceptable such that pi
(j)
i (aj) ≤ pi(i)i (am).
15Firms cannot commit not to enter the upstream market; however, endogenously, the incentives to corner
the upstream market may disappear.
16Brito and Pereira (2006) note that, in their framework, it could actually be satisfied if one of the three
integrated firms could commit to exit the upstream market.
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Proposition 2. Under Assumptions 1 and 3, there exists an equilibrium, in which a1 =
a2 = a∗ if and only if a∗ ≤ am and pi(i)i (a∗) = pi(i)j (a∗). These equilibria are referred to as
matching-like equilibria.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
In a matching-like equilibrium, both integrated firms offer the same upstream price and
are indifferent between supplying the upstream market and not supplying it. Notice that the
perfect competition outcome a1 = a2 = cu is always a (matching-like) equilibrium outcome,
as already stated in Remark 1.
However, nothing precludes the existence of other matching-like equilibria featuring either
a supra-competitive upstream market (a∗ > cu) or a super-competitive upstream market
(a∗ < cu). The existence of these equilibria also hinges on the softening effect. For a∗ > cu,
the integrated firm which does not supply the upstream market benefits from the softening
effect and does not want to undercut. For a∗ < cu, the softening effect is reversed. The
upstream supplier offers a low downstream price to reduce the upstream demand, which
hurts its integrated rival. Even though the upstream supplier makes losses on the upstream
market, it does not want to exit that market since it would then suffer from an adverse
softening effect.
We conclude this paragraph with the following result:
Proposition 3. Under Assumptions 1-3:
• Only monopoly-like and matching-like outcomes can arise in equilibrium.
• From the viewpoint of the integrated firms, any monopoly-like equilibrium Pareto-dominates
any matching-like equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
Propositions 1, 2 and 3 provide a characterization of all the possible equilibria of our
game. Moreover, the monopoly-like equilibria, when they exist, Pareto-dominate all other
equilibria from the integrated firms’ standpoint. Therefore there is a strong presumption
that these equilibria will actually be played when they exist.
Last, as intuition suggests, one can show that, under additional reasonable assumptions,
partial foreclosure equilibria degrade consumers’ surplus and social welfare.17
17See Section IV in our web appendix (Bourreau, Hombert, Pouyet and Schutz, 2010) for the complete
welfare analysis.
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3.4 An illustrative example
3.4.1 The dilemma between upstream and downstream competitiveness
A key determinant of the persistence of the monopoly outcome is the degree of differentiation
of the unintegrated downstream firm. Suppose that the entrant is on a niche market, in the
sense that its demand does not depend on the prices set by the downstream rivals and vice-
versa.18 In that situation, the wholesale profit of the upstream supplier is fully disconnected
from its retail behavior and the softening effect disappears. Hence, with an unintegrated
downstream firm on a niche market, the perfect competition outcome always emerges in
equilibrium.
Downstream demands are derived from the maximization of a representative consumer’s
utility with the following quasi-linear preferences:
(4) U = q0 +
∑
k∈{1,2,d}
qk − 1
2
 ∑
k∈{1,2,d}
qk
2 − 3
2(1 + γ)
 ∑
k∈{1,2,d}
q2k −
(
∑
k∈{1,2,d} qk)
2
3
 ,
where q0 denotes consumption of the numeraire and qk is consumption of product k ∈ {1, 2, d}.
These preferences generate the following demand functions:
(5) Dk(p) =
1
3
(
1− pk − γ(pk − p1 + p2 + pd
3
)
)
.
γ ≥ 0 parameterizes the degree of differentiation between final products, which can be
interpreted as the intensity of downstream competition. Perfect competition corresponds
to γ approaching infinity and local monopolies to γ = 0. All firms have the same linear
downstream costs: ck(q) = cq.
19 With that specification, the assumptions we have made on
the second stage demands, payoff functions, best-responses, etc. are satisfied. Assumptions 1
and 3 are satisfied as well. Finally, we also suppose that Assumption 2 holds.
Figure 2 offers a graphical representation of the profit functions pi
(i)
i (.), pi
(i)
j (.) and pi
(i)
d (.).
As discussed in Section 3.2, when ai > cu, two opposite effects are at work. On the one
hand, the upstream supplier derives profit from the upstream market; on the other hand,
its integrated rival benefits from the softening effect on the downstream market. When the
upstream price is not too high, the upstream profit effect dominates and pi
(i)
i (ai) > pi
(i)
j (ai).
When the upstream price is high enough, upstream revenues shrink, the softening effect is
strengthened and pi
(i)
i (ai) < pi
(i)
j (ai).
18Formally, ∂Dd/∂pi = ∂Di/∂pd = 0 for i ∈ {1, 2}.
19We assume that the total unit cost cu + c is strictly smaller than the intercept of the demand functions
1, otherwise, it would not be profitable to be active in the final market.
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Profits
pi
(i)
i (.)
pi
(i)
j (.)
pi
(i)
i (am)
pi
(i)
i (cu) = pi
(i)
j (cu)
pi
(i)
d (.)
cu a∗ am
Figure 2: Profits in the symmetric linear case (γ ≥ γ¯).
We then obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 4. Consider the symmetric linear case. There exists γ¯ > 0 such that:
If γ ≥ γ¯, then there exist four equilibrium outcomes on the upstream market:20
• the perfect competition outcome;
• a supra-competitive matching-like outcome;
• two monopoly-like outcomes.
Otherwise, the perfect competition outcome is the only equilibrium outcome.
Proof. See Appendix A.5.
To grasp the intuition of the proposition, suppose that the upstream market is supplied at
the monopoly upstream price. When the substitutability between final products is strong, the
integrated firm which supplies the upstream market is reluctant to set too low a downstream
price since this would strongly contract its upstream profit. The other integrated firm benefits
from a substantial softening effect and, as a result, is not willing to corner the upstream
market. There exists a monopoly-like equilibrium when downstream products are sufficient
20The perfect competition and monopoly-like equilibria are stable; the matching-like is unstable.
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substitutes. By the reverse token, only the perfect competition outcome emerges when the
competition on the downstream market is sufficiently weak.21
Proposition 4 highlights a tension between competitiveness on the downstream market
and competitiveness on the upstream market. Intuitively, the same downstream interactions
which strengthen the competitive pressure on the downstream market, are those which soften
the competitive pressure on the upstream market. This tension is revealed in downstream
prices, which turn out to be non-monotonic in the substitutability parameter (provided that a
monopoly-like equilibrium is selected when it exists). The level of downstream prices results
indeed from two combined forces: the level of upstream prices on the one hand, and the
intensity of downstream competition/substitutability on the other hand.
This suggests that strongly differentiated unintegrated downstream firms are more likely
to enter in the market, not only because entrants have incentives to differentiate to avoid
head-to-head competition, but also because they are more likely to benefit from attractive
wholesale offers by integrated firms. The evidence in the mobile market is consistent with
this interpretation. Indeed, many MVNOs target specific market segments, either by using
their brand reputation,22 or by investing in network elements to increase their differentiation
possibilities.23
3.4.2 Efficiency of the entrant
Another key determinant of partial foreclosure is the efficiency of the unintegrated down-
stream firm. Intuitively, an efficient entrant tends to obtain a large market share and to
purchase large quantities of input on the upstream market. This raises the upstream profit
effect and, in turn, strengthens the vertically integrated firms’ incentives to cut upstream
prices. Therefore, we expect the upstream market to be more competitive when the entrant
is more efficient.
We confirm this intuition by adding a downstream cost differential to the linear specifica-
tion used in our first example. Integrated firms still have the same downstream marginal cost
c, while firm d’s marginal cost is now c+ δ. δ is thus a measure of the relative inefficiency of
the entrant.
Proposition 5. Consider the asymmetric linear case. For any γ ≥ 0, there exists δ(γ) such
that:
21Ordover and Shaffer (2007) consider the same example, but they restrict their attention to γ ≤ 10 while
γ > 10. This is the reason why the condition for monopoly-like equilibria never holds in their paper.
22For instance, teenagers for Virgin Mobile in the UK or NRJ Mobile in France.
23For instance, Euskaltel and Budget Telecom are ‘full’ MVNOs, i.e., they own all the network elements of
a traditional mobile operator except the radio equipments. They specifically offer cross-border services.
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• If δ ≥ δ(γ), then there are four equilibrium outcomes: Two monopoly-like outcomes, a
matching-like outcome, and the perfect competition outcome.
• Otherwise, the perfect competition outcome is the only equilibrium.
Proof. See our web appendix (Bourreau, Hombert, Pouyet and Schutz, 2010, Section I.1).
When firm d is rather inefficient (δ ≥ δ(γ)) the gains from supplying the upstream market
are small, as firm d purchases a small quantity of input. The upstream profit effect is weak.
Moreover, the softening effect, which operates at the margin, is not affected by the size of
the upstream demand. Therefore, when the entrant is rather inefficient, the incentives to
undercut the upstream market are small and partial foreclosure arises in equilibrium.
4 Regulation
We have just seen that competition on wholesale markets may fail to develop, thereby giving
rise to partial foreclosure equilibria. In this section, we show that several tools, which have
been used or considered by telecoms regulators, such as a wholesale price cap, the entry of
an unintegrated upstream competitor, or the vertical separation of an integrated operator,
can restore the competitiveness of the upstream market.
4.1 Price cap
In several countries (e.g., France, Spain, Belgium, Italy), the telecoms regulator sets a price at
which the broadband incumbent has to supply any service-based firm. This does not prevent
the incumbent from negotiating lower tariffs with downstream firms. Therefore, the regulated
price can be seen as a price cap on the incumbent’s wholesale offer. In the following, we show
that this kind of regulation can favor the development of tough wholesale competition, and
remove all partial foreclosure equilibria, even if the price cap is strictly above marginal cost.
As a first step, let us inspect Figure 2, which depicts firms’ profits in the symmetric linear
case. Notice that for any ai ∈ (cu, a∗), pi(i)i (ai) > pi(i)j (ai): in this range of upstream prices,
it is always better to be the upstream supplier. Consequently, if the regulator sets any price
cap between cu and a∗, then, the only equilibrium is the perfect competition outcome.
Now we would like to extend this result to more general demand and cost systems. A
price cap a > cu eliminates all partial foreclosure equilibria if pi
(i)
i (ai) > pi
(i)
j (ai) for all
ai ∈ (cu, a]. Since pi(i)i (cu) = pi(i)j (cu), it follows immediately that there exists a price cap
strictly above marginal cost which restores the competitiveness of the upstream market if
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dpi
(i)
i
dai
(cu) >
dpi
(i)
j
dai
(cu). The following proposition provides sufficient conditions under which this
inequality is satisfied:24
Proposition 6. Assume that firms’ downstream divisions are identical, downstream costs
are weakly convex, and
• downstream prices are strategic complements and ∂2Dk
∂p2k
≤ 0 for all k ∈ {1, 2, d}.
• or, ∂2Dk
∂pk∂pk′
≥ 0 for all k 6= k′ in {1, 2, d}.
A low enough price cap, strictly above the upstream marginal cost, destroys all partial fore-
closure equilibria, and the perfect competition outcome remains an equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix A.6.
A price cap can restore the competitiveness of the wholesale market, provided that the
upstream supplier earns more profits than its integrated rival when the upstream price is
slightly above the marginal cost. Put differently, the upstream profit effect has to dominate
the softening effect for ai sufficiently close to cu. A good proxy to assess the strength of the
softening effect is the difference between the upstream supplier’s and the integrated rival’s
downstream prices. This gap is small if the upstream supplier does not raise its downstream
price by much when the upstream price increases, which is the case when a firm’s demand
is concave with respect to its own price, and downstream costs are convex. Besides, if prices
are strategic complements, the integrated rival increases its price as well, which implies an
even smaller gap between downstream prices, hence, a small softening effect. This is the first
sufficient condition in Proposition 6.
Second, even if the upstream supplier does increase its price a lot, the gap may still be
small if the integrated rival reacts by also increasing its price a lot, namely, if downstream
prices are strongly strategic complements. A sufficient condition for this is ∂2Dk/∂pk∂p
′
k ≥ 0
and convex costs. This is the second sufficient condition in the proposition.25
We would like to emphasize that Proposition 6 does not come from a simple mechanical
effect. Of course, imposing a price cap reduces the upstream price mechanically. But, more
fundamentally, under the assumptions detailed in Proposition 6, a price cap initiates a
24We did not manage to obtain a general result when firms are asymmetric. Still, it can be shown that
when demand is linear and firm d has a cost differential δ, profit functions are as depicted in Figure 2 and a
price cap can always restore the competitiveness of the upstream market.
25It should be noticed that this reasoning, which derives conditions for the upstream profit effect to dom-
inate the softening effect, is only valid in the neighborhood of cu. Therefore, the sufficient conditions given
in Proposition 6 do not imply that partial foreclosure equilibria do not exist. For instance, in the symmetric
linear case, both sufficient conditions hold and monopoly-like equilibria exist when γ is high enough.
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process by which integrated firms will undercut each other, leading to tough competition in
the wholesale market. Interestingly, a price cap can influence the outcome of the market even
though the regulatory constraint does not bind (i.e., the upstream price is strictly smaller
than the price cap) in equilibrium. Therefore, a regulator who observes an entrant getting
access to the input at a price strictly below the price cap should not conclude that the price
cap is useless. Note also that it is sufficient to impose a price cap on one of the integrated
firms only to fuel competition in the wholesale market.
We conclude this subsection by noting that the threat of investment by firm d can have
the same impact as a price cap on the wholesale market. Consider the following alteration of
our game: between stage 1 and stage 2, after having observed the integrated firms’ upstream
offers, the unintegrated downstream firm can pay a sunk investment cost to build its own
network. If it does so, it becomes able to produce the intermediate input at marginal cost
cu. If the investment cost is not too large, there is a threshold a¯, such that firm d invests if,
and only if the cheapest wholesale offer is above a¯. Since integrated firms prefer to face a
relatively less efficient competitor, at least one integrated firm will make an offer below a¯ to
prevent firm d from investing: firms behave exactly as if a¯ were a price cap. If the cost of
bypass is low, then a¯ is low as well, and, under the assumptions of Proposition 6, the input
price goes down to marginal cost.
This result has interesting policy implications. In the mobile industry, it means that fa-
vorable terms for spectrum licences (e.g., terms for ungranted mobile licences, or for Wimax
licences) can increase MNOs’ incentives to set low wholesale prices for MVNOs. In the broad-
band market, it implies that favorable conditions for local loop unbundling investments (e.g.,
low rates for colocation in the historical operator’s premises) might stimulate the development
of the wholesale broadband market.
4.2 Entry of an unintegrated upstream competitor
Suppose that, in addition to integrated firms 1 and 2, an unintegrated upstream competitor,
firm u, is able to produce the intermediate input at constant marginal cost cu. There are
two situations in which such an upstream unit can enter the wholesale market. First, local
authorities can invest in broadband networks and offer wholesale services to service-based
operators.26 Second, some private companies can decide to enter as unintegrated upstream
26In France, at the end of 2007, 2% of the population had no access to broadband services. In addition
to these so-called ’white zones’, the French regulator, ARCEP, keeps track of the ’grey zones’, in which only
the incumbent operator France Te´le´com has installed broadband equipments. ARCEP views investments by
municipalities in both ’white’ and ’grey’ zones as legitimate; in the white zones, to offer broadband services; in
the grey zones, to foster facility-based competition. In March 2008, there were 55 projects from municipalities
for a total amount of 1.3 billion euros. Out of a total number of 2,674 main distribution frames in October
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providers. For instance, in the broadband market, firms like Covad or Northpoint in the
US, or Mangoosta in France, adopted this strategy. In the mobile market, so-called mobile
virtual enablers (MVNEs) are also unintegrated upstream firms.27 In both cases, we argue
that the entry of an unintegrated upstream competitor stimulates competition in wholesale
markets more surely than entry of (and competition between) integrated firms. Intuitively, an
unintegrated upstream firm is not subject to the softening effect, since it does not participate
to the downstream market. As a result, the entry of firm u restores the competitiveness of
the upstream market:
Proposition 7. Assume that prices are strategic complements. When an unintegrated up-
stream firm enters the industry, all partial foreclosure equilibria disappear, and the perfect
competition outcome remains an equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix A.7.
The intuition for Proposition 7 is the following. If integrated firm i ∈ {1, 2} supplies the
upstream market at price ai > cu, then, firm u always wants to undercut, for its sole source of
profit comes from the upstream market. Conversely, if firm u supplies the upstream market
at price au > cu, then, firm 1 wants to undercut for two reasons. First, undercutting enables
firm 1 to capture the upstream profits. Second, when firm 1 becomes the upstream supplier,
it behaves less aggressively on the downstream market, and, by strategic complementarity,
firms 2 and d react by increasing their prices as well. By a revealed preference argument,
these price increases benefit firm 1.
Having said that, it becomes clear that the upstream market cannot be supplied above
marginal cost in equilibrium. As noted earlier, in our basic setting, Remark 1 implies that
the perfect competition outcome is always a subgame-perfect equilibrium. Obviously, adding
an unintegrated upstream competitor does not affect this result.
2007, there were 988 with a municipal network.
27Examples of MVNEs are Versent Mobile and Visage Mobile in the US, Transatel in France and Belgium,
Effortel in Belgium.
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4.3 Vertical separation
Policymakers have often contemplated the structural separation of a dominant operator.28,29
The typical argument in favor of vertical separation, which only applies when a firm has a
monopoly position over a bottleneck, is that a vertically integrated firm has an incentive
to use its upstream price to raise its rivals’ costs; vertical separation then annihilates this
incentive. Our argument is different. We claim that when several integrated firms compete
on the upstream market, vertical separation of one integrated firm annihilates the softening
effect and restores the firms’ incentives to compete fiercely on the upstream market. To
make this point, we assume that firm 2 has been vertically separated and call d1 and d2 the
unintegrated downstream firms. We establish that, under an additional technical assumption,
Proposition 7 extends to the vertical separation of an integrated firm.
Assumption 4. (i) Upstream suppliers cannot discriminate between downstream firms. (ii) Down-
stream firms choose their upstream supplier after downstream prices have been set.30
Proposition 8. Consider the vertical separation of a vertically integrated firm in the basic
model. If Assumption 4 holds and if downstream prices are strategic complements, then, the
perfect competition outcome is the only equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix A.8.
There is an important difference between vertical separation and the entry of an unin-
tegrated upstream competitor in our framework: after vertical separation has taken place,
there are two unintegrated downstream firms. This implies that we need both (i) and (ii) in
Assumption 4 to prove Proposition 8.
To see why we need (i), consider that discrimination is allowed on the upstream market.
Then, we cannot exclude that the following situation arises in equilibrium. Integrated firm 1
offers upstream price a1 to firm d1, and unintegrated upstream firm u offers price au to firm
28For instance, Viviane Reding, then member of the European Commission responsible for Information
Society and Media declared in May 2007: “I believe that functional separation (. . . ) could indeed serve
to make competition more effective in a service-based competition environment where infrastructure-based
competition is not expected to develop in a reasonable period. It may be a useful remedy in specific cases.
It is certainly not a panacea.” (Viviane Reding, “How Europe can Bridge the Broadband Gap”, Brussels, 14
May 2007).
29Since the broadband industry has a three-tiered structure (local loop-wholesale products-retail services),
two types of separation could be implemented. First, the local access unit of the incumbent operator could
be separated from its wholesale-retail unit. Second, the Internet service provider unit of the incumbent could
be separated from the local loop-wholesale unit. The latter situation has been observed in some countries.
For instance, in France, the incumbent Internet service provider, Wanadoo, was a subsidiary of its parent
company, France Te´le´com, between 2000 and 2004.
30Notice that this assumption would not change the results of the previous sections, since Assumption 1
already ensured that the unintegrated downstream firm chose the cheapest supplier in our basic framework.
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d2, where a1 and au are the monopoly prices of firms 1 and u respectively.
31 Firm u prefers
not to make an acceptable offer to unintegrated downstream firm d1, since, if that offer were
eventually accepted, firm 1 would become more aggressive on the downstream market, which
would erode the profit earned by firm u on firm d2. Similarly, firm 1 prefers not to make
an acceptable offer to firm d2, since if that offer were accepted, firm 1 would become less
aggressive on the downstream market. By strategic complementarity, firm d1 would increase
its downstream price as well, which could lower its demand, and hence, the upstream profit
that firm 1 makes on firm d1.
To understand point (ii) in Assumption 4, consider that firms cannot discriminate on
the upstream market, but assume that unintegrated downstream firms elect their upstream
suppliers before the downstream competition stage. Then, the following situation may be an
equilibrium. Firms 1 and u set the monopoly upstream prices a1 and au, as defined in the
previous paragraph. Consider that a1 > au, which makes sense, since a vertically integrated
firm has more incentives than an unintegrated upstream firm to charge a high upstream price.
It may then be that firm d1 purchases from firm 1 to make the integrated firm less aggressive
on the final market, while firm d2 chooses firm u to benefit from a lower upstream price.
The situations described in the above paragraphs seem rather unlikely, and we have not
been able to exhibit them using standard demand specifications. Assumption 4 enables us
to rule them out in our general framework.
5 Extensions and Discussions
We now discuss some extensions and robustness checks.
5.1 Robustness Checks
Two-part tariffs. We now show that partial foreclosure equilibria with positive upstream
profits always exist under two-part tariff competition on the upstream market. Denote by
ai (respectively, Ti) the variable (respectively, the fixed) part of the tariff set by firm i. In a
monopoly-like outcome, firm i sets the variable part which maximizes the sum of its profit
and firm d’s profit, i.e., atp = arg maxai pi
(i)
i (ai) + pi
(i)
d (ai),
32 while firm j makes no upstream
offer. The fixed fee Ti captures firm d’s profit, i.e., Ti = pi
(i)
d (atp). This is an equilibrium
provided that firm j does not want to undercut, or: pi
(i)
i (atp) + pi
(i)
d (atp) ≤ pi(i)j (atp).
31Formally, a1 = arg maxa pi
(1,u)
1 (a, au) and au = arg maxa pi
(1,u)
u (a1, a), where pi
(j,k)
i (aj , ak) denotes the
profit of firm i when firms d1 and d2 are supplied by firms j and k, respectively, at prices aj and ak.
32See Bonanno and Vickers (1988).
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If the above inequality is not satisfied, then there exists an equilibrium in which both
integrated firms charge the variable part atp and a fixed fee equal to pi
(i)
j (atp) − pi(i)i (atp),
which makes them indifferent between supplying the upstream demand or not. Under two-
part tariff competition, this is a matching-like equilibrium.33
Proposition 9. Under two-part tariff competition on the upstream market, there exist either
monopoly-like or matching-like equilibria.
Proof. Immediate.
Once again, upstream competition may not modify the outcome with respect to the
monopoly benchmark. If the upstream equilibrium is monopoly-like, both the fixed and the
variable parts of the tariff remain the same; obviously, downstream prices are not affected
either. If the equilibrium is matching-like, competition modifies the fixed part only, without
affecting any downstream prices. In other words, the only impact of competition is to redis-
tribute some profits from the integrated firms to the unintegrated downstream firm. Besides,
provided that atp > cu,
34 it is straightforward to show that the upstream profit is strictly
positive.35 In this sense, competition on the upstream market may still be ineffective with
two-part tariffs.
Market structure. Our results are robust to larger numbers of firms. Consider a market
with M ≥ 2 vertically integrated firms and N ≥ 1 unintegrated downstream firms. As in the
case where M = 2 and N = 1, we assume that integrated firms do not want to (or cannot)
completely foreclose the unintegrated downstream firms. This amounts to assuming that the
analogs of Assumptions 2 and 3 hold when M ≥ 2 and N ≥ 1. We also know from Section 4.3
that equilibria may be difficult to compute when there are several unintegrated downstream
firms. To get around this issue, we suppose that the analog of Assumption 4 holds, namely,
we assume that integrated firms cannot price discriminate on the upstream market, and that
unintegrated downstream firms choose their upstream suppliers at the end of period 2, once
downstream prices have been set.
It can then be an equilibrium that one integrated firm supplies all unintegrated down-
stream firms at its monopoly upstream price. Lemmas 1 and 2 easily extend to larger numbers
33For conciseness, we do not report other equilibria in which the upstream market is supplied by one firm,
whose upstream offer is constrained by the offer of its integrated rival.
34A sufficient (but not necessary) condition for this is that prices are strategic complements.
35If the equilibrium is monopoly-like, this is obvious. If it is matching-like, then the upstream profit is
equal to [atp − cu]Dd(p(i)(atp)) + pi(i)j (atp) − pi(i)i (atp) =
[
p
(i)
j (atp)− cu
]
Dj(p
(i)(atp)) − cj
(
Dj(p
(i)(atp))
) −[
p
(i)
i (atp)− cu
]
Di(p
(i)(atp)) + ci
(
Di(p
(i)(atp))
)
, which is strictly positive by Lemma 2.
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of firms: When one integrated firm sells the input at a strictly positive price-cost margin to
all the entrants, it charges a strictly higher downstream price and earns a strictly smaller
downstream profit than the other integrated firms. As a result, the integrated rivals may not
want to undercut to benefit from the softening effect.
To go further, we prove the analog of Proposition 5 in this extended framework with M
integrated firms and N downstream firms. As in Section 3.4.2, assume that downstream
demands are derived from the maximization of a representative consumer’s utility with the
following preferences:
U = q0 +
M+N∑
k=1
qk − 1
2
(
M+N∑
k=1
qk
)2
− M +N
2(1 + γ)
(
M+N∑
k=1
q2k −
(
∑M+N
k=1 qk)
2
M +N
)
Suppose also that integrated firms have a cost dis-advantage δ relative to unintegrated down-
stream firms. We obtain the following result:
Proposition 10. Consider the asymmetric linear case with M integrated firms and N unin-
tegrated downstream firms. For all γ ≥ 0, M ≥ 2 and N ≥ 1, there exists δM,N(γ) such that
monopoly-like equilibria exist if, and only if, δ ≥ δM,N(γ).
Proof. See our web appendix, Section III (Bourreau, Hombert, Pouyet and Schutz, 2010).
Quantity competition. The softening effect exists if the upstream supplier can enhance
its upstream profits by behaving softly on the downstream market. As discussed previously,
this requires that it actually interacts with the unintegrated downstream firm. One may
wonder whether the softening effect hinges on the assumption of price competition on the
downstream market, for if the downstream strategic variables are quantities and all firms
play simultaneously, then the upstream supplier can no longer impact its upstream profit
through its downstream behavior. However, if for instance integrated firms are Stackelberg
leaders on the downstream market, then the upstream supplier’s quantity choice modifies its
upstream profit, and the softening effect is still at work. To summarize, the question is not
whether firms compete in prices or in quantities, but whether the strategic choice of a firm
can affect its rivals’ quantities.36
Upstream demand sharing. Throughout the paper, we have assumed that the upstream
market could be supplied by one integrated firm only. Consider now that, when upstream
36With a linear demand function and quantity competition, if integrated firms are Stackelberg leaders
on the downstream market, then a monopoly-like equilibrium always exists. Computations are available at
http://sites.google.com/site/nicolasschutz/research.
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offers are identical, the upstream demand is split equally between integrated firms. This
would be a reasonable assumption if there were several downstream firms. In that case,
we can still think about the upstream market in terms of softening effect and upstream
profit effect. When the integrated firms share the upstream market, they both obtain some
upstream profits, and they both benefit from a softening effect, since they both have incentives
to protect their upstream revenues. Behaviors on the upstream market still trade off the
softening effect and the upstream profit effect.
It becomes clear that the possibility for equilibrium partial foreclosure remains. Monopoly-
like equilibria feature the same outcome as in the basic model. Matching-like equilibria can
also exist, in which the upstream market is shared between integrated firms.37
5.2 Complete vs. Partial Foreclosure.
When Assumption 2 holds, we have identified conditions under which partial foreclosure arises
in equilibrium. As mentioned in Section 3.1, Assumption 2 may hold for several reasons.
To begin with, there may be a regulation in place, which forces one or more integrated
firms to make an acceptable upstream offer to downstream entrants. This, of course, is
relevant in the telecommunications industry. In many European broadband markets, the
incumbent’s wholesale bitstream access offers are regulated. In some countries (e.g., Austria,
Ireland, Portugal, Sweden), the access price is set on a retail minus basis. In other countries
(e.g., France, Italy, the Netherlands), the access price should be “cost-oriented.” Similarly,
in many European countries, MNOs are obliged to give access to their networks to MVNOs.
In some countries (e.g., Denmark, Sweden), this obligation has been put in force by law. In
other countries (e.g., France, Germany), mobile licenses include a clause that forces the MNO
to accept MVNO access requests. For example, in 2006, the French MNO SFR was refusing
access to candidate MVNO Afone. Following a complaint to the regulatory authority, SFR
was forced to provide an acceptable offer to Afone, due to the access obligation in its mobile
licence.38
There may also be bypass opportunities. A downstream firm could pay a sunk cost to
start producing its own input if this input is not available in the market, as explained at the
end of Section 4.1. Again, integrated firms would then prefer to make an acceptable offer
37For instance, using the Salop demand specification with d = 1/3, and assuming that the un-
integrated downstream firm splits equally its demand when upstream prices are identical, we ob-
tain the following subgame-perfect equilibria: the two monopoly-like outcomes, the perfect com-
petition outcome, and a continuum of equilibria in which both integrated firms set the same
price above marginal cost, and share the upstream demand. Computations are available at
http://sites.google.com/site/nicolasschutz/research.
38See Arcep De´cision 06-0406 of April 4, 2006.
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rather than let that happen. In the broadband market, there is a viable bypass option for the
pure service-based firm: installing its own DSL equipments and leasing unbundled access to
the incumbent’s local loop at a regulated price. Possibilities of bypass are more limited in the
mobile market, although an ungranted mobile licence could still represent a credible threat
of bypass. For example, in July 2007, Numericable, the French cable network announced
that it had signed an MVNO contract with MNO Bouygues Telecom and at the same time
announced that it renounced to be candidate for the French 4th mobile licence. Before this
contract, Bouygues Telecom had always refused to host MVNOs on its network.
When neither of the above conditions are satisfied, Assumption 2 can still hold because in-
tegrated firms actually want to supply downstream firm d. This arises provided that pi
(i)
i (am)
is greater than, piduo, the duopoly profit an integrated firm earns when firm d is squeezed
from the market. In that case, complete foreclosure cannot be sustained at equilibrium.
In the following we exhibit two commonly used downstream demand systems, in which
an integrated firm strictly prefers supplying the entrant than squeezing it from the market.
In these examples, monopoly-like equilibria continue to exist, even when Assumption 2 is not
imposed.
Example 1: Representative consumer with a quasi-linear quadratic utility and downstream cost
differential. The linear demand system comes from the maximization of quadratic quasi-linear
utility function (4). When firm d is active on the downstream market, demand functions are
given by equation (5). When firm d is squeezed, demand functions are obtained by imposing
the constraint that the quantity purchased from firm d is zero in the representative consumer’s
program.39 As in Section 3.4.2, firm d has a downstream cost (dis-)advantage δ (which can
be positive or negative) compared to the integrated firms.
There exists a set of parameters (γ, δ) such that Assumption 2 holds together with the
existence condition for monopoly-like equilibria. The following proposition precisely delin-
eates the regions where partial foreclosure equilibria and complete foreclosure equilibria exist.
These areas are depicted in Figure 3.40
Proposition 11. Consider the asymmetric linear case without Assumption 2. There exist a
39See Ho¨ﬄer (2008).
40Consistent with the idea that partial foreclosure is more likely when γ is large (Proposition 4), we observe
that δ(γ) decreases in γ up to a threshold γˆ with δ(γˆ) < 0. However, we also find that δ(γ) is negative and
increasing when γ > γˆ. The reason is that when γ increases, competition becomes fiercer and the consequences
of cost differentials are magnified. This implies that the cost differential δ(γ) needed to obtain equilibrium
partial foreclosure goes to 0 as γ goes to infinity. This explains why δ(γ) eventually increases with γ. A
similar insight obtains for δ(γ). In particular, the fact that δ(γ) is initially decreasing points to the intuition
that complete foreclosure is more likely when downstream competition tightens as the entrant cannibalizes
more of its supplier’s downstream demand.
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threshold γ > 0 and a cutoff function γ 7→ δ(γ) such that δ(γ) ≤ δ(γ) if, and only if, γ ≥ γ,
and:
(i) if δ < min{δ(γ), δ(γ)}, then the only equilibrium outcome is the Bertrand outcome;
(ii) if δ(γ) ≤ δ ≤ δ(γ), then there is an equilibrium with a monopoly-like outcome on the
upstream market;
(iii) if δ ≥ δ(γ), then there is an equilibrium with complete foreclosure on the upstream
market.41
Proof. This proposition, as well as its extension to two-part tariffs and convex downstream
costs (discussed below), is proven in Section I.2 of our web appendix (Bourreau, Hombert,
Pouyet and Schutz, 2010).
0 γ
δ
δ(γ)
δ(γ)
γ
(i) Bertrand
outcome
(iii) Complete
foreclosure
(ii) Monopoly-like
outcome
Figure 3: The three regions of Proposition 11
There exists a complete foreclosure equilibrium when the profits from supplying the en-
trant are small, which occurs when the entrant is rather inefficient: δ ≥ δ(γ). A monopoly-
like equilibrium emerges when the cost (dis-)advantage of the entrant is between [δ(γ), δ(γ)],
which, in the linear example, is non-empty when final products are sufficiently strong sub-
stitutes (γ > γ).
These results may be used to build a typology of the competitive issues faced by non-
integrated entrants: inefficient entrants face a risk of complete foreclosure; fairly efficient
entrants face a risk of partial foreclosure; finally, very efficient entrants enjoy a competitive
upstream market and can compete on a level playing field. A similar insight obtains when
integrated firms compete in two-part tariffs on the upstream market. In that case, we show
41To complete the characterization of all the equilibria: The Bertrand outcome is always an equilibrium,
and there is an equilibrium with a matching-like outcome a1 = a2 > cu on the upstream market when
δ ≥ δ(γ).
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that there exists a threshold δtp(γ) such that the entrant is (i) fully foreclosed when δ > δtp(γ)
and (ii) partially foreclosed otherwise. The equilibrium in the latter case is the matching-like
equilibrium of Proposition 9.
Another intuitive determinant for the emergence of partial or complete foreclosure is
the cost structure. Consider indeed that downstream costs are convex. With decreasing
returns to scale, it is profitable to split the cost between a vertically integrated firm and
the entrant, which makes complete foreclosure less attractive. To confirm this intuition, we
add a quadratic term cqD
2
k to the downstream cost function of every firm k ∈ {1, 2, d}, with
cq > 0. By continuity of the profit functions in cq, Proposition 11 continues to hold as long
as cq is not too large. Consistent with the intuition that diminishing returns to scale reduce
the extent of complete foreclosure, we find that, as cq increases from 0, γ decreases and the
partial foreclosure region expands.
Example 2: Spatial competition with exogenous locations. Firms compete on the Salop (1979)
unit length circle, consumers have unit demands, transport costs are quadratic, and the gross
utility is large enough to ensure that the market is covered in all equilibrium configurations.
Firms 1 and 2 are at a distance 1/3 from each other and firm d, if it gets access to the
input, is located at a distance d ∈ (0, 2/3) from firm 1 on the longer segment separating the
vertically integrated firms. Downstream costs are linear and identical across firms.
Note that integrated firms 1 and 2 are no longer symmetric when d 6= 1/3. Although our
basic model has symmetric integrated firms, the assumption that their downstream divisions
are symmetric is not crucial. When this assumption is relaxed, it is straightforward to adapt
the proofs of Lemmas 1 and 2 to restate them as follows: For ai > cu, vertically integrated firm
i charges a strictly higher downstream price and earns strictly smaller downstream profits if
it supplies the upstream market at price ai than if its integrated rival does, p
(i)
i (ai) > p
(j)
i (ai)
and (p
(i)
i (ai)− cu)Di(p(i)(ai))− ci(Di(p(i)(ai))) < (p(j)i (ai)− cu)Di(p(j)(ai))− ci(Di(p(j)(ai))).
We can also rewrite Proposition 1 with asymmetric integrated firms. To do so, notice
first that the profit functions and the monopoly upstream prices, a
(i)
m = arg maxai pi
(i)
i (ai),
are no longer the same for the two integrated firms. More importantly, if firm i supplies the
upstream market at price a
(i)
m , then setting aj = a
(i)
m − ε may not be firm j’s most profitable
deviation. The first reason comes from the demand side: since integrated firms are no longer
symmetric, firm d may actually prefer purchasing from firm i at a
(i)
m to purchasing from firm
j at a
(i)
m − ε. The second reason comes from the supply side: if a(j)m < a(i)m , firm j would
prefer setting a
(j)
m to setting a
(i)
m − ε. To take these new effects into account, denote by
a
(j)
u firm j’s best undercutting price when firm i supplies the input at price a
(i)
m . Formally,
a
(j)
u ≡ arg maxaj pi(j)j (aj) subject to the constraint pi(j)d (aj) ≥ pi(i)d (a(i)m ). Then, Condition (3)
in Proposition 1, which states that firm j prefers not to undercut, can be rewritten as
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pi
(i)
j (a
(i)
m ) ≥ pi(j)j (a(j)u ).
We find that, depending on the value of the distance d, either partial foreclosure or
complete foreclosure can be sustained at equilibrium:
Proposition 12. Consider the Salop specification without Assumption 2. There exists d ∈
(0, 1/3) such that:
• there is a monopoly-like equilibrium in which integrated firm 1 supplies the upstream
market if, and only if, d ∈ (0, d);
• there is an equilibrium with complete foreclosure on the upstream market if, and only
if, d ∈ (d, 2/3− d);
• there is a monopoly-like equilibrium in which integrated firm 2 supplies the upstream
market if, and only if, d ∈ (2/3− d, 2/3).
Proof. This proposition, as well as the result on input differentiation (mentioned below), is
proven in Section II of our web appendix.
A monopoly-like equilibrium emerges when the entrant’s product is a close substitute
to one of the integrated firms’ product. In addition, the upstream market ends up being
monopolized by the integrated firm whose final product is closer to the entrant’s product. To
understand the intuition, remember that there exists a monopoly-like equilibrium, in which
firm 1 supplies the upstream market if and only if piduo ≤ pi(1)1 (a(1)m ) and pi(2)2 (a(2)u ) ≤ pi(1)2 (a(1)m ).
Consider first that firm 1 supplies the input to the downstream firm and assume that
distance d is small. Then, firm 1’s downstream price has a strong impact on firm d’s demand.
The softening effect is consequently strong, and firm 2 has little incentives to undercut. Put
differently, condition pi
(2)
2 (a
(2)
u ) ≤ pi(1)2 (a(1)m ) is easier to meet when firm d is closer to firm 1.
Second, condition piduo ≤ pi(1)1 (a(1)m ) is more likely to be satisfied, i.e., firm 1 has less
incentives to completely foreclose firm d, when distance d is small. This is because when
firm 1 starts supplying firm d, firm 2 reacts to the entry of a new rival by lowering its
downstream price, which hurts firm 1. This effect is weaker if firm 2 is less threatened by
entry, which occurs when firm d is located closer to firm 1. Hence we get the surprising result
that integrated firm 1 has more incentives to start supplying the entrant if the products of
firms 1 and d are closer substitutes.
As a straightforward extension, consider that firm d’s location depends on the identity
of its upstream supplier. Assume now that firm d is located at distance d ≤ 1/3 from
its upstream supplier. The interpretation is that the input is differentiated and that this
differentiation translates into the final products, as in Ordover and Shaffer (2007). This
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implies that d’s product is a closer substitute to its wholesale supplier’s product than to
the other integrated firm’s. In this case, integrated firms are still asymmetric, but their
equilibrium profit functions now satisfy pi
(1)
1 (.) = pi
(2)
2 (.) and pi
(2)
1 (.) = pi
(1)
2 (.). Therefore, both
integrated firms have the same monopoly upstream price am, and monopoly-like equilibria
exist if, and only if, piduo ≤ pi(i)i (am) ≤ pi(i)j (am). As in Proposition 12, we find that monopoly-
like equilibria exist if, and only if, 0 < d ≤ d¯, and there is a complete foreclosure equilibrium
if, and only if, d¯ ≤ d ≤ 1/3. The intuition is the same as before. When d is small, an
integrated firm which starts supplying the downstream firm does not suffer too much from
the adverse reaction of its integrated rival. Besides, the softening effect is strong, which
weakens the incentives to undercut the upstream supplier. We can conclude that partial
foreclosure becomes a more likely outcome when the input is more differentiated.
6 Conclusion
Our analysis has focused on the links between vertically-related markets, when the upstream
good is an essential input to the downstream product, and when the competitors on the
upstream market are also rivals on the downstream one. One of the main insights conveyed
in the paper is that undercutting decisions on the upstream market trade off the softening
effect and the upstream profit effect. Because of this, competition on these upstream markets
may not be effective, and the monopoly outcome may persist even when competition in that
market is possible.
Our results may rationalize the concerns expressed by the French Competition Authority
when reviewing the proposed merger between two broadband providers, Cegetel and Neuf
Telecom. Before the merger, these operators owned together between 30 and 50 percent of
the national wholesale broadband market, while the incumbent historical operator (France
Te´le´com) supplied the rest. The merger received clearance in August 2005 under the condi-
tion that the joint entity continued to provide its wholesale services, highlighting the perceived
fear that the competition between two integrated firms on the upstream market may de facto
lead to a monopoly.42 Our analysis suggests that imposing such a constraint on one of the
integrated incumbents may be an appropriate remedy to ensure that the wholesale market
is competitive.
42See DGCCRF, De´cision C2005-44 related to the merger between Neuf Telecom and Cegetel.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Assume that integrated firm i ∈ {1, 2} is the upstream supplier at price ai > cu, and let us
show that p
(i)
i (ai) > p
(i)
j (ai).
Let us first give a sketch of the proof. Start from a hypothetical situation, in which
integrated firm i would supply the upstream market at marginal cost, and unintegrated
downstream firm d would set p
(i)
d (ai) on the downstream market, and analyze the outcome of
the ensuing price competition game between the two integrated firms. There exists a symmet-
ric Nash equilibrium in this reduced game. Then, assume that firm i increases its upstream
price from cu to ai. Its downstream best-response shifts upwards, while firm j’s best-response
remains unaffected. These curves intersect at least once, at coordinates
(
p
(i)
i (ai), p
(i)
j (ai)
)
,
since
(
p
(i)
i (ai), p
(i)
j (ai), p
(i)
d (ai)
)
is a Nash equilibrium of the three-player game. Since the
slopes of the best-response functions are smaller than one, we obtain that p
(i)
i (ai) > p
(i)
j (ai).
This is depicted graphically in Figure 4 for the case of strategic complements (left panel) and
strategic substitutes (right panel).
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Figure 4: Graphical representation of the proof of Lemma 1
Let us now write down the formal proof. Assume that firm i supplies the upstream market
at marginal cost, and firm d sets p
(i)
d (ai) on the downstream market. Let p¯ an upper bound
for the integrated firms’ best-response functions. p ∈ [0, p¯] 7→ BR(i)i
(
p, p
(i)
d (ai), cu
)
∈ [0, p¯] is
continuous.43 By the Brouwer fixed point theorem, this function has a fixed point, which we
denote by p∗. When the upstream price is set at marginal cost, integrated firms are identical,
therefore, they have the same best-responses, and p∗ is a fixed point for BR(i)j (., p
(i)
d (ai), cu)
as well. As a result, there exists a Nash equilibrium of the two-firm game, in which both
43As can be seen by applying the implicit function theorem to equation (1), this function is even continu-
ously differentiable.
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firms set p∗. p∗ satisfies p∗ = BR(i)i
(
p∗, p(i)d (ai), cu
)
= BR
(i)
j
(
p∗, p(i)d (ai), cu
)
.
Assume now that integrated firm i increases its upstream price from cu to ai. Clearly,
firm j’s best-response is not affected (see equation (2)). The impact on firm i’s best-response
is obtained by differentiating equation (1):
∂BR
(i)
i
∂ai
= − ∂2p˜i
(i)
i
∂pi∂ai
/
∂2p˜i
(i)
i
∂p2i
= −∂Dd
∂pi
/
∂2p˜i
(i)
i
∂p2i
, which is
strictly positive since the second-order condition is satisfied. Therefore, firm i’s best-response
shifts upwards when ai increases. In particular, BR
(i)
i (., ., ai) > BR
(i)
i (., ., cu) = BR
(i)
j (., ., ai).
Since (p
(i)
i (ai), p
(i)
j (ai), p
(i)
d (ai)) is a downstream equilibrium, we have
p
(i)
i (ai) = BR
(i)
i
(
BR
(i)
j
(
p
(i)
i (ai), p
(i)
d (ai), ai
)
, p
(i)
d (ai), ai
)
.
Therefore,
(6) p
(i)
i (ai) > BR
(i)
i
(
BR
(i)
j
(
p
(i)
i (ai), p
(i)
d (ai), cu
)
, p
(i)
d (ai), cu
)
.
Define Φ(p) = BR
(i)
i
(
BR
(i)
j
(
p, p
(i)
d (ai), cu
)
, p
(i)
d (ai), cu
)
− p, and notice that Φ(p∗) = 0. Φ
is continuously differentiable and strictly decreasing, since the slopes of the best-response
functions are strictly smaller than 1. Therefore, Φ(p) < 0 if and only if p > p∗. Together
with inequality (6), this implies that p
(i)
i (ai) > p
∗.
We conclude the proof by using the stability condition
∣∣∣∣∂BR(i)j∂pi
∣∣∣∣ < 1:
p
(i)
j (ai) = BR
(i)
j
(
p
(i)
i (ai), p
(i)
d (ai), ai
)
= BR
(i)
j
(
p
(i)
i (ai), p
(i)
d (ai), cu
)
= p∗ +
∫ p(i)i (ai)
p∗
∂BR
(i)
j
∂pi
(
pi, p
(i)
d (ai), cu
)
dpi < p
(i)
i (ai).
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Let integrated firm i ∈ {1, 2} be the upstream supplier at price ai > cu. Its downstream
profit is given by:
(7) (p
(i)
i (ai)− cu)Di(p(i)i (ai), p(i)j (ai), p(i)d (ai))− ci
(
Di(p
(i)
i (ai), p
(i)
j (ai), p
(i)
d (ai))
)
.
Since p
(i)
i (ai) > p
(i)
j (ai) by Lemma 1, there exists pˆ > p
(i)
i (ai) such thatDi(p
(i)
i (ai), p
(i)
j (ai), p
(i)
d (ai)) =
Di(pˆ, p
(i)
i (ai), p
(i)
d (ai)). Downstream profit (7) is thus strictly smaller than:
(pˆ− cu)Di(pˆ, p(i)i (ai), p(i)d (ai))− ci
(
Di(pˆ, p
(i)
i (ai), p
(i)
d (ai))
)
.
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By symmetry between integrated firms, this expression is equal to the downstream profit
that rival integrated firm j would earn if it charged the downstream price pˆ instead of its
actual equilibrium price p
(i)
j (ai). This profit, by revealed preference, is strictly smaller than
the actual downstream profit of firm j, which concludes the proof.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Suppose first that both integrated firms offer the same upstream price a∗ ≤ am, such that
pi
(i)
i (a∗) = pi
(i)
j (a∗). The unintegrated downstream firm chooses indifferently one of them as
its upstream supplier, and both integrated firms earn the same profit.
Consider an upward deviation of integrated firm i, be it the upstream supplier or not.
Now, by Assumption 1, firm d strictly prefers buying the upstream good from firm j at price
a∗, and firm i’s profit is unchanged. Consider now a downward deviation: ai < a∗. Firm d
strictly prefers to buy from firm i, which then earns pi
(i)
i (ai). By Assumption 3, since a∗ ≤ am,
this profit is smaller than pi
(i)
i (a∗) = pi
(i)
j (a∗). That situation is therefore an equilibrium.
Conversely, consider that both integrated firms offer the same upstream price a∗. Suppose
first that a∗ > am. The upstream supplier then has a strictly profitable deviation: propose
am.
If pi
(i)
i (a∗) < pi
(i)
j (a∗), then the upstream supplier would rather set an upstream price above
a∗ to earn pi
(i)
j (a∗).
If pi
(i)
i (a∗) > pi
(i)
j (a∗), then the integrated firm which does not supply the upstream market
would rather set an upstream price slightly smaller than a∗ to earn a profit almost equal to
pi
(i)
i (a∗).
A.4 Proof of Proposition 3
Consider by contradiction an equilibrium configuration in which ai < aj and ai 6= am. By
Assumption 1, the upstream supplier is firm i. If aj > am, it is a strictly profitable deviation
for firm i to offer am. If aj ≤ am, firm 1 would rather charge any upstream price in (ai, aj),
since pi
(i)
i (.) is increasing in this interval by Assumption 3.
Let us now show that a monopoly-like equilibrium Pareto-dominates any matching-like
equilibrium, from the viewpoint of integrated firms. We have pi
(i)
j (am) ≥ pi(i)i (am) by Propo-
sition 1. Consider a matching-like equilibrium at upstream price a∗. By definition of am,
pi
(i)
i (am) ≥ pi(i)i (a∗) = pi(i)j (a∗). This concludes the proof.
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A.5 Proof of Proposition 4
Assume that integrated firm i supplies the upstream market at price ai, and denote its
integrated rival by j. To begin with, it is straightforward to see that we can normalize all
upstream and downstream costs to c = cu = 0, by redefining upstream prices as
ai−cu
1−c−cu and
downstream prices as pk−c−cu
1−c−cu .
Then, for all downstream and upstream prices, for k ∈ {1, 2, d}, we have ∂2p˜i
(i)
k
∂p2k
= −2
3
(1 +
2
3
γ) < 0. This ensures that the best-response functions are uniquely defined. The stability
condition is satisfied, since, for all k 6= k′, we have
∣∣∣∣∂BR(i)k∂pk′
∣∣∣∣ = γ6+4γ < 1. There is a unique
downstream equilibrium, which can be computed by solving the set of first-order conditions.
The equilibrium quantity served by downstream firm d is positive if and only if ai ≤ amax(γ) ≡
6+5γ
6+7γ+γ2
> 0. Assumption 1 is satisfied, since pi
(i)
d (ai) =
(1+γ)2(6+γ)2(3+2γ)
4(3+γ)2(6+5γ)2
[ai − amax(γ)]2, thus
pi
(i)
d (.) is decreasing for ai ≤ amax(γ).
The profit of the upstream supplier is strictly concave since
d2pi
(i)
i
da2i
=
−648+1944γ+2205γ2+1158γ3+269γ4+20γ5
6(18+21γ+5γ2)2
< 0. Firm i’s maximum is reached for ai = am(γ) ≡
324+594γ+360γ2+75γ3
648+1296γ+909γ2+249γ3+20γ4
. Since am ∈ (0, amax(γ)), Assumption 3 is satisfied.
pi
(i)
i (.) and pi
(i)
j (.) are parabolas, they cross each other twice, in ai = 0 and in ai = a∗(γ) ≡
9(12+16γ+5γ2)
108+180γ+93γ2+13γ3
. pi
(i)
i (.) is strictly concave and pi
(i)
j (.) is convex since
d2pi
(i)
j
da2i
= (3+2γ)γ
2(1+γ)2
2(3+γ)2(6+5γ)2
≥
0. Hence, we have:
pi
(i)
i (ai) ≥ pi(i)j (ai) ⇔ ai ∈ [0, a∗(γ)].(8)
Let us now check whether am(γ) ∈ [0, a∗(γ)]:
am(γ)− a∗(γ) = 3(3 + γ)(6 + 5γ)(−648− 1296γ − 864γ
2 − 183γ3 + 5γ4)
(108 + 180γ + 93γ2 + 13γ3)(648 + 1296γ + 909γ2 + 249γ3 + 20γ4)
.
Analyzing the above function, we establish that there exists γ > 0, such that am(γ) ≥ a∗(γ)
if, and only if, γ ≥ γ.
Since pi
(i)
i (0) = pi
(i)
j (0) and 0 ≤ am(γ), Proposition 2 implies that the perfect competition
outcome is always an equilibrium.
If γ < γ, then 0 < am(γ) < a∗(γ). By Proposition 1, (8) implies that there is no
monopoly-like equilibrium. Moreover a∗(γ) > am(γ) implies by Proposition 2 that there is
no other matching-like equilibrium than the perfect competition outcome.
Similarly, if γ ≥ γ, then am(γ) ≥ a∗(γ) and there exist monopoly-like equilibria. This
is also a necessary and sufficient condition for the matching-like equilibrium with upstream
price a∗.
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Finally, to make sure that all these equilibria are indeed equilibria we have to check
that, in the downstream competition subgame, the upstream supplier does not want to lower
discontinuously its downstream price to drive firm d out of the market. This is proven in our
web appendix (Bourreau, Hombert, Pouyet and Schutz, 2010, end of Section I.1).
A.6 Proof of Proposition 6
Let i 6= j in {1, 2}. We show that the conditions stated in Proposition 6 are sufficient to
have
dpi
(i)
i
dai
(cu) >
dpi
(i)
j
dai
(cu). To simplify the exposition, we introduce the following notations. p
denotes the equilibrium downstream price set by the three firms when the upstream market is
supplied at marginal cost. D denotes the demand addressed to each firm when all downstream
prices are equal to p. We also denote by c′ and c′′ the first and second derivatives of the
downstream cost function when the quantity produced is D. Last, we define δ ≡ ∂Dk
∂pk
,
δ˜ ≡ ∂Dk
∂pk′
, γ ≡ ∂2Dk
∂p2k
and γ˜ ≡ ∂2Dk
∂pk∂pk′
, where all the derivatives are taken at price vector
(p, p, p), and k 6= k′ in {1, 2, d}.44
With these notations, when ai = cu, the first-order conditions on the downstream market
can be rewritten as (p − cu − c′)δ + D = 0. The second-order conditions are given by
(2− δc′′)δ + (p− cu − c′)γ < 0, and the stability condition is:∣∣∣∣∣(1− δc′′)δ˜ + (p− cu − c′)γ˜(2− δc′′)δ + (p− cu − c′)γ
∣∣∣∣∣ < 1.
Notice also that, if downstream prices are strategic complements, then, (1− δc′′)δ˜+ (p− cu−
c′)γ˜ ≥ 0. Besides, since the total demand is decreasing, δ + 2δ′ ≤ 0.
Differentiating the profit functions with respect to ai for ai = cu, we obtain:
dpi
(i)
i
dai
(cu) = (p− cu − c′)δ˜
(
dp
(i)
j
dai
(cu) +
dp
(i)
d
dai
(cu)
)
+D,
dpi
(i)
j
dai
(cu) = (p− cu − c′)δ˜
(
dp
(i)
i
dai
(cu) +
dp
(i)
d
dai
(cu)
)
.
Therefore,
(9)
dpi
(i)
i
dai
(cu)−
dpi
(i)
j
dai
(cu) = D − (p− cu − c′)δ˜
(
dp
(i)
i
dai
(cu)−
dp
(i)
j
dai
(cu)
)
.
44Notice that, since the three firms are identical, p, D, c′, c′′, δ, δ˜, γ and γ˜ are well-defined, and do not
depend on k or k′.
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As usual, we obtain the expression of
dp
(i)
i
dai
(cu) − dp
(i)
j
dai
(cu) by differentiating firms i and j’s
first-order conditions with respect to ai. We get:
dp
(i)
i
dai
(cu)−
dp
(i)
j
dai
(cu) =
δ˜
−
(
(2− δc′′)δ + (p− cu − c′)γ − ((1− δc′′)δ˜ + (p− cu − c′)γ˜)
) .
Plugging this into equation (9), using the first-order conditions to get rid of the D term, and
rearranging terms, we finally obtain:
dpi
(i)
i
dai
(cu)−
dpi
(i)
j
dai
(cu) =
p− cu − c′
−
(
(2− δc′′)δ + (p− cu − c′)γ − ((1− δc′′)δ˜ + (p− cu − c′)γ˜)
)
×
(
−δ˜2 + δ
(
(2− δc′′)δ + (p− cu − c′)γ − ((1− δc′′)δ˜ + (p− cu − c′)γ˜)
))
.
The stability and second-order conditions imply that the denominator in the right-hand side
is positive. Therefore, the above expression is positive if, and only if
−δ˜2 + (−δ)
(
(−δ)(2− δc′′)− (p− cu − c′)γ + δ˜(1− δc′′) + (p− cu − c′)γ˜
)
> 0.
Since δ < 0, −δ > δ˜ > 0, p− cu − c′ > 0, c′′ > 0, and (−δ)(2− δc′′)− (p− cu − c′)γ > 0 this
is the case if:
• δ˜(1− δc′′) + (p− cu− c′)γ˜ ≥ 0 (namely, if downstream prices are strategic complements
at price vector (p, p, p)), and γ ≤ 0,
• or if γ˜ ≥ 0.
A.7 Proof of Proposition 7
First, this is obvious that the unintegrated downstream firm cannot be completely foreclosed
in equilibrium, since the unintegrated upstream firm would then prefer to make any accept-
able offer above the marginal cost. Similarly, suppose that integrated firm 1 supplies the
upstream market at a1 > cu. Then, by Assumption 1, pi
(1)
d (a1) < pi
(1)
d (cu) = pi
(u)
d (cu). By
continuity, there exists au > cu, such that pi
(u)
d (au) > pi
(1)
d (a1): a strictly profitable deviation
for firm u.
Suppose now that the upstream market is supplied by unintegrated upstream firm u at
price a > cu. Let us show that integrated firm 1 can corner the upstream market and enhance
its profit by matching firm u’s offer, i.e., by proposing a1 = a. Assume that firms 1 and u
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propose the same upstream price a > cu, while firm 2 makes no offer.
45 Since ∂2p˜i
(i)
k /∂pkpk′ ≥
0 for all k 6= k′ ∈ {1, 2, d}, the game defined by the payoff functions (pk, p−k) ∈ R3+ 7→
p˜i
(i)
k (pk, p−k, a) is smooth supermodular, parameterized by i ∈ {1, u}. For all k, ∂p˜i(u)k /∂pk ≤
∂p˜i
(1)
k /∂pk, therefore, p˜i
(i)
k (pk, p−k, a) has increasing differences in (pk, i) with the order relation
u < 1. Besides, the downstream equilibrium is, by assumption, unique. Supermodularity
theory (see Vives 2001, Theorem 2.3) tells us that the equilibrium of that game is increasing
in i, i.e., p
(u)
k (a) ≤ p(1)k (a) for k = 1, 2, d. Moreover, the inequality is strict for k = 1. Indeed,
since p˜i
(i)
1 (p1, p−1, a) has strictly increasing differences in (p1, i), we can write the following
inequalities:
0 =
∂p˜i
(u)
1
∂p1
(p
(u)
1 (a), p
(u)
2 (a), p
(u)
d (a), a) ≤
∂p˜i
(u)
1
∂p1
(p
(u)
1 (a), p
(1)
2 (a), p
(1)
d (a), a)
<
∂p˜i
(1)
1
∂p1
(p
(u)
1 (a), p
(1)
2 (a), p
(1)
d (a), a).
A revealed preference along the line of the proof of Lemma 2 implies that firm d strictly
prefers to purchase from firm 1 than from firm u.
By the same revealed preference argument, firm 1’s downstream profit is larger when it
supplies the upstream market than when firm u does. In addition, it gets strictly positive
upstream profit. Therefore, matching firm u’s offer is a strictly profitable deviation, which
concludes the proof.
A.8 Proof of Proposition 8
The proof that the upstream market cannot be supplied above marginal cost in equilibrium
proceeds as in the proof of Proposition 7. To streamline the analysis, we only provide the
main steps. To begin with, notice that, if a firm wants to corner the upstream market,
it just needs to slightly undercut its rival. Indeed, because of Assumption 4, unintegrated
downstream firms cannot commit to purchasing from a more expensive supplier. Consider
that the upstream market is supplied by firm 1 at price a1 > cu. Then, firm u can set
au = a1 − ε, and corner the upstream market. Conversely, if firm u supplies the upstream
market at price au > cu, then firm 1 sets ai = au−ε, since, as in the proof of Proposition 7, this
enables it to capture the upstream profits, and to relax downstream competition. Therefore,
the upstream market cannot be supplied above marginal cost.
45The new notations are similar to the previous ones: p˜i
(u)
k (., ., a) denotes the profit of firm k when the
upstream market is supplied by firm u at price a, while p
(u)
k (a) denotes its downstream price at downstream
equilibrium.
36
Let us now demonstrate that the perfect competition outcome is the only equilibrium.
Assume that firms 1 and u set a1 = au = cu. Obviously, firm u does not want to undercut.
Firm 1 does not want to undercut either, since it would then make upstream losses. Besides,
we claim that all final prices would decrease, which gives even less incentives to undercut.
To see this, assume that firm 1 undercuts by setting aˆ < cu, and notice that the game
defined by payoff functions (pk, p−k) ∈ [0,+∞)3 7→ p˜i(i)k (pk, p−k, a) is smooth supermodular,
parameterized by a ∈ {aˆ, cu}. For all k, ∂p˜i(i)k (., ., cu)/∂pk ≥ ∂p˜i(i)k (., ., aˆ)/∂pk, therefore,
p˜i
(i)
k (pk, p−k, a) has increasing differences in (pk, a). Besides, the downstream equilibrium
is, by assumption, unique. Supermodularity theory (see Vives 2001, Theorem 2.3) tells us
that the equilibrium of this game is increasing in a. Therefore, p
(i)
k (cu) ≥ p(i)k (aˆ) for all k.
Therefore, the perfect competition outcome is an equilibrium.
Last, let us check that the upstream market cannot be supplied below cost in equilibrium.
First, if firm u supplies the upstream market below cu, it has a strictly profitable deviation:
set au = cu. Conversely, if firm 1 supplies the upstream market at a1 < cu, then, we claim
that it can also strictly increase its payoff by setting cu. To make this point, we need to
distinguish two cases, depending on whether au ≶ cu. First, if au ≥ cu, then, firm 1’s
payoff increases, since the integrated firm gets rid of its upstream losses, and, using again
the supermodularity argument developed in the previous paragraph, all downstream prices
increase. If, on the other hand, au < cu, then, firm u becomes the upstream supplier. Again,
firm 1 gets rid of its upstream losses, and, using this time the supermodularity argument
from the proof of Proposition 7, all prices increase. This concludes the proof.
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